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THE LIMITS OF NATURAL LAW: THOMAS
RUTHERFORTH AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
TRADITION
GARY L. McDOWELL

The history of American constitutional jurisprudence has been
marked by a persistent fascination with the idea of natural law. This
springs first and foremost from the fact that we understand as our
constitutional foundation those "laws of Nature and of Nature's
God" to which Thomas Jefferson made such eloquent appeal in the
Declaration of Independence. Further, American politics since the
founding of the republic has been characterized by a commitment,
with more or less success, to the simple truth James Madison posited
in The Federalist. "Justice," Madison declared, "is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever
will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the
pursuit."' Natural law has provided a convenient rhetorical framework
for the moral progress of our politics.
But natural law understood in what sense? In and of itself, the
term naturallaw is vague and ambiguous; its content is not immediately
apparent. As a result, the history of natural law in American political
life is a history marked more by the utility of the phrase than by
the moral certainty of the idea. It can be claimed by either side in
almost any debate. At its deepest level, the idea of natural law that
has periodically percolated to the surface of American politics is a
confused collection of often contradictory claims. Whether "natural
law" is being invoked in the sense of St. Thomas Aquinas or in the
sense of Thomas Hobbes is a very important thing to know; the
philosophic differences are profound. 2 Sorting out those differences
is thus essential to understanding the proper relationship of the
Constitution to the sweeping historical tradition of natural law.
Implicit in the natural law foundation of the written Constitution
is the question of when and how may the people recur to that
1. James Madison, in The Federalist (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961), No. 51, p.
352.
2. "[T]he mere fact that an identical expression recurs in different writers is
no proof of the continuity of thought from one to the other." A.P. d'Entreves,
Natural Law (1951), p. 9.
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foundation, to the natural law and natural rights that undergird the
constitutional edifice. How is the textual permanence of the written
Constitution to be reconciled practically with the philosophic
permanence of those self-evident truths of the laws of nature and of

nature's God? More precisely, what role was intended for natural
law in interpreting the written Constitution?
A useful guide in this inquiry is Thomas Rutherforth, whose
Institutes of Natural Law was a work widely read and cited among
those of the Founding generation and of the first generation under

the Constitution of 1787. 3 But Rutherforth's influence is not merely
time-bound; he has been summoned as authority on both sides of
4
the contemporary debate in constitutional theory.
I.

THOMAs RUTHERFORTH AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION

Those of the current generation who find Rutherforth worthy of
regard are not the first in the scholarly community this century to
do so. Rutherforth and his Institutes were duly noted and respected
by earlier generations of American scholars. Roscoe Pound, for
example, was a frequent student of Rutherforth. While he was willing
to confess that he found "nothing of consequence in ...Rutherforth's
Institutes of Natural Law which is not in Grotius," Pound was also
willing to rank Rutherforth with both Grotius and Aristotle as being
''no mean authorities upon natural law.'' 5 Pound was especially

3. Institutes of Natural Law (1832). All citations are to this, the second
American edition. The Institutes was first published in 1754-56. The Institutes
formed the basis of a series of lectures by Rutherforth on Hugo Grotius' De Jure
Belli et Pacis which he read in St. John's College, Cambridge. Rutherforth (17121771) was the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge and Archdeacon of Essex.
Besides the Institutes, most of Rutherforth's writings were more sacred than secular.
He did, however, turn his attention (while professing on the physical sciences at
Cambridge) to produce A System of Natural Philosophy: Being a Course of Lectures
in Mechanics, Optics, Hydrostatics, and Astronomy (1748). In addition he wrote in
1744 An Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue.
4. See for example, Thomas Grey, "Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought," 30 Stan. L. Rev. (1978),
p. 30; Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (1975);
Suzanna Sherry, "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution," 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
(1987), p. 1127; Helen K. Michael, "The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of 'Unwritten' Individual Rights?", 69 N.C. L. Rev. (1991), p. 421; Raoul Berger, Government
by Judiciary (1977); and Walter Berns, "Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws
of Nature," The Supreme Court Review: 1982 (1983), pp. 49-83.
5. Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (1938), p. 21; and Law
and Morals (1924), p. 101. See also Pound's other numerous essays and articles,
wherein Rutherforth is usually presented when the subject is natural law; for example:
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conscious of the frequent use made of Rutherforth by the earlier
American lawyers and professors such as James Wilson and Joseph
6
Story.
William W. Crosskey, despite his often eccentric inferences from
the sources, was properly impressed with the work Rutherforth had
provided in distilling the canons of construction that had grown up
as "an ancient, long-respected part of the common law." Indeed,
Crosskey found Rutherforth's rules of rational or equitable
interpretation to be "a comprehensive, lucid, and systematic

discussion." 7
More recently, John Philip Reid has taken notice of Rutherforth's
Institutes of NaturalLaw in his work on the ideas of representation
and liberty in the age of the American Revolution. 8 Reid seems to
agree, as Caroline Robbins argued before him, that Rutherforth's
Institutes "repay reading by students of eighteenth century ideas." 9
Ultimately, however, Rutherforth's significance lies less in what
recent generations of scholars have thought of him than in how the
first generations of statesmen and judges under the Constitution
viewed him. And those earlier generations thought well of him,
indeed. The founders found it advantageous to rely on his work

during the creation and the ratification of the Constitution; 0 the

"The Revival of Natural Law Concepts," 17 N.D. Lawyer (1942), pp. 287, 304,
332; "Liberty of Contract," 18 Yale L.J. (1909), pp. 454, 468; "The End of Law
as Developed in Juristic Thought," 27 Harv. L. Rev. (1914), p. 605; Interpretations
of Legal History (1946); and Jurisprudence.
6. Formative Era of American Law, p. 24.
7. William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution (1953), 1, pp. 364-65.
8. John Philip Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American
Revolution (1989); and The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American
Revolution (1990).
9. Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman (1961), p.
333. See also Duncan Forbes, Hume's PhilosophicalPolitics (1975), pp. 162-65. As
Forbes notes at p. 164: "Rutherforth's moral ... is that you cannot prove a
constitution to be popular by abstract arguments 'from general reasonings upon the
nature of civil government, without recourse to records and history, custom and
usage."'I
10. See, for example, James Madison's list of books prepared (probably with
the help of Thomas Jefferson) for Congress in 1783, in The Papers of James
Madison (William T. Hutchinson, et al, eds. 1969), Vol. VI, pp. 62-115. See the
remarks of Luther Martin in The Records of the FederalConvention (Max Farrand,
ed. 1938), Vol. I, p. 437. Arguably of greater significance is Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist (Jacob Cooke, ed. 1961), No. 84, p. 583. See The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton (Harold C. Syrett, ed. 1961-79), Vol. XV, p. 187 and Vol.
XIX, p. 131. In his essay on "The Defence of the Funding System," Hamilton
again called Rutherforth's Institutes to his argument; summing up his apparently
long-standing regard for the writer, Hamilton referred to Rutherforth as "a sensible
modern writer." Ibid., Vol. XIX, p. 507.
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Institutes was frequently included in curricula during the early years
of legal education;" Rutherforth was routinely cited as authority in
actual cases at bar, both in briefs and in opinions; 2 and finally and
most importantly Rutherforth greatly influenced the early American
treatise writers such as James Kent, 3 Henry Wheaton, 4 David
6
Hoffman, 5 and especially Joseph Story.
Story's uses of Rutherforth's Institutes of NaturalLaw in both his
Commentaries on the Constitution and his Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence did much to make Rutherforth a common authority
in the nineteenth century. Coming as they did out of his lectures at
Harvard Law School, and running to many editions each, Story's
Commentaries were widely influential in the training of the early
11. For the best accounts of early legal training see Charles Warren, History of
the Harvard Law School (1908); Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal
Profession in America (1965); and Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A
History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967 (1967). For a taste of the times, see the law
lectures at the College of Philadelphia (later the University of Pennsylvania) by
James Wilson, The Works of James Wilson (Robert McCloskey, ed. 1967). A
portion of James Kent's lectures at Columbia, A Lecture, Introductory to a Course
of Law Lectures in Columbia College, Delivered February 1, 1824, is reprinted in
The Rise of the Legal Profession in America, Vol. II, p. 184, n. 48.
12. For example, in McDonough v. Dannery and Ship Mary Ford, 3 Dallas 188
(1796), both Jared Ingersoll and Peter DuPonceau cited Rutherforth in support of
their position before the Court, p. 196. That same year, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas
199 (1796), Justice Samuel Chase relied in the course of his opinion on "the
celebrated and judicious Doctor Rutherforth," p. 230. See also Daniel Webster's
argument in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213, 240 (1827). And see the arguments-on both sides-in the great slavery case, The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 99
n.b.; 103 n.b.
13. See Volume I, part one, pp. 1-200, passim; 465. James Kent, Commentaries
on American Law (1840).
14. In his History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America, Wheaton
noted that the "great work of Grotius ... [was] the principal textbook for instruction
in most European universities in that part of the science of morals which relates to
the rules of justice. One of the best commentaries of this sort is that published in
1754 by Rutherforth under the title of Institutes of Natural Law," (1845), p. 197.
See also Wheaton's Elements of InternationalLaw (A.C. Boyd, ed. 1880), pp. 34445.
15. See A Course of Legal Studies (1830); and Legal Outlines (1836). It is
interesting to note that Hoffman's publisher, J. Neal, was the same publisher who
brought out the second American edition of Rutherforth in 1832. Reviewing Hoffman's Course of Legal Studies in the North American Review, Story hailed it. as
"by far, the most perfect system for the study of law which has ever been offered
to the public."
16. Beginning in the 1820's, America gave rise to a treatise tradition in law. It
was an effort to reduce the vagaries and varieties of the common law to some
regular and systematic form in a manner similar to what had been achieved by
Blackstone for the laws of England. Gary L. McDowell, Equity and the Constitution
(1982), pp. 61-86.
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American bar. In many ways, Story did for American law in the
nineteenth century what Blackstone and Coke had done for American
law and legal education in the eighteenth. In particular, his canons
of construction, adopted as they were in large part from Rutherforth,
sought to teach the American legal community the pitfalls of
interpretation. But more than that: his canons of construction taught
respect for the line that must be seen to exist between the law of
nature and the law of the Constitution as a matter of construing the
latter.
In the legal and political arguments of the American Founding
and the early decades of the republic, Rutherforth's Institutes of
Natural Law was viewed as a most serious contribution to political
theory. Men such as Story, Ingersoll, Kent, Du Ponceau, Wilson,
Webster, Chase, and Martin saw in Rutherforth's work ideas of law
and constitutionalism worthy of their public regard; his ideas were
not for closet speculators, but for statesmen.
II.

THOMAS RUTHERFORTH'S CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

There are two aspects to the significance of Thomas Rutherforth's
rules of interpretation offered in the Institutes of Natural Law that
justify attention. First, by recovering why those earlier thinkers and
lawyers had such an appreciation for Rutherforth's Institutes, we can
gain a keener appreciation ourselves for how that generation
understood themselves. To that degree, we will have a firmer grip
on the original understanding of the Constitution and the thinking
that went into its creation and ratification as well as into its earliest
interpretations.
The second aspect of Rutherforth's significance has to do with
what he still has to say to our generation when it comes to attempting
to interpret the Constitution and to understanding the nature and
extent of interpretation more generally. There is no reason to presume
that Rutherforth's insights are merely archaic and doomed to the
dust of ages past. Like the works of all serious thinkers, his theory
of government may contain much that is timeless; by endeavoring to
take his work seriously on its own terms, we may be able to glean
notions of estimable contemporary value.
Rutherforth's canons of construction are best understood within
the broader context of his view of civil society and law more
generally.
A.

RUTHERFORTH'S THEORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

While narrowly a commentary on Grotius, Rutherforth's Institutes
is, more broadly understood, a part of the body of modern political
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philosophy, at least insofar as that tradition begins with Thomas
Hobbes if not Machiavelli. Yet while Lockean in his understanding
of the nature and extent of rights, Rutherforth is less willing to
embrace the idea of an antecedent state of nature. 17 Ever suspicious
of "abstracted philosophers" and their "amusing . . . speculations,"
Rutherforth prefers "to read history, to collect and consider usages
and customs, to search records, to examine and compare facts."' 8
In fact, his discussion of the beginnings of civil society is more
Biblical, taking its point of departure from the account in Genesis
concerning the rise of the Jewish state. But however he sees the
origin of civil society, Rutherforth is modern in his understanding
of rights, both natural and civil.' 9 "The natural consequence," he
argues, "of men's forming a civil society is the establishment of a
power, in such society, to settle or ascertain, by its joynt or common
understanding, the several rights and duties of those, who are members
of it, and of a power, likewise, to act with its joynt or common
force for their defence and security.' '20
Rutherforth's understanding of the rise of nations is two-fold. First
there comes the moment when men join together to enter into a
social contract to promote their common interests and to remove
themselves from the possibility of political "distress." The second
step comes after the formation of that civil society and entails the
creation of a form of government. The first involves the broader
and more fundamental social compact; the latter the narrower and
derivative constitutional compact. 2' But what legitimates both steps
toward nationhood is the basic and inalienable liberty of the individual.
Echoing Hobbes and Locke, Rutherforth argues that outside of
civil society and its law-making apparatus, man is at liberty "to act
as he thinks fit, where no law restrains him." This is, he notes,
"self-evidently true." 22 Originally, outside civil society, the only
restraint over a man's liberty to act as he sees fit is his "obligation
of governing himself by the law of nature, and the law of God." ' 23
17. See generally his discussion "Of Civil Society, Its Nature and Origin," in
the second chapter of volume II of the Institutes.
18. Institutes, p. 297.
19. As Rutherforth argues: "Another division of our rights is into natural and
adventitious. Those are called natural rights which belong to man by the gift of
nature, those, which belong to him originally without the intervention of any human
act. Adventitious rights are such as presuppose some act of man." Institutes, p. 19.
20. Ibid., p. 270.
21. Ibid., p. 583.
22. Ibid., p. 74.
23. Ibid.
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This view of freedom is liberty understood in "a moral sense"; it is
liberty that springs from nature, not from convention.
The only legitimate way that man may be restrained by others is
by what Rutherforth terms "some after-act of our own," a conscious
delegation of the power to restrict our liberty to some external
authority. As he explains it:
Whatever right those of our species may have over us, either to
direct our actions to certain purposes, or to restrain them within
certain bounds, beyond what the law of nature has prescribed,
arises from some after-act of our own, from some consent either
express or tacit, by which we have alienated our liberty, or
transferred the right of directing our actions from ourselves to
them. Till this is done, they have no claim of superiority over us:
nature has made no difference between one man and another: all,
who are of full age, have reason of their own to direct them, and
a will of their own to chuse for themselves. 24
As with Locke, the basis of Rutherforth's understanding of liberty
derives from his more fundamental belief in the natural equality of
mankind. Rutherforth does not subscribe to a notion of equality that
is unrealistically egalitarian; nature does, harsh as it is, make
distinctions "between the parts and capacities of mankind." But, he
goes on, "this difference in parts and capacities may have made it
more convenient for some to be directed and for others to direct;
yet it cannot possibly be looked upon as a sufficient reason, why
the former should be slaves, and the latter their absolute masters.

' 25

Nature is not without its spots; but the defects and differences given
by nature do not legitimate conventional control absent the consent
of the individual. "The weak man's mind and his body," Rutherforth
says, "and consequently all the faculties of his mind, such as his
judgment and his will, and likewise all the powers of his body, are
as much his own, as if nature had given him greater strength, and
enabled him to make a more effectual struggle in his own defence." ' 26
Even though it may be safer to defer to the judgment of those
possessed of stronger faculties of mind, Rutherforth concludes, that
decision is a "matter of prudence only, not a matter of duty. ' 27
Thus is consent the only legitimate foundation for civil society.
Civil society is, by definition, an abridgement of the natural and
inalienable liberty of the individual. 28 As a result, "it would be an
24. Ibid., p. 74.

25. Ibid., p. 239.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 74.
28. Ibid., p. 258.
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injury to take any part of their natural liberty from them without
their consent .

.

. [Clivil societies could not be formed, consistently

with natural justice, by any other means, than by the joynt consent,
either express or tacit, of those who compose it." 29 Any claim society
presumes to have over the individual can only derive from his prior
consent; such consent is the simple reciprocal of the natural equality
of mankind.
When an individual becomes a member of civil society, the public
or body politic claims a right of pointing out to him what is just
and unjust, and of directing him likewise what good he is to do,
and in what manner he is to do it. There is no way of making
such a claim as this consistent with his natural right of thinking
and chusing for himself; unless by his own consent ...

he has

waived this right and has voluntarily agreed to be so guided and
directed.30

Once given, this consent obligates those within civil society to be
bound by the laws that will be fashioned by the government (to
which consent must also be given) therein. The reason is that the
entire notion of consent is not simply a conventional contrivance for
public convenience; it is nothing less than a part of the natural law
itself. Since such obligations "arising from consent are obligations
of the law of nature; it follows, that the members of any civil society
are obliged by the law of nature to obey the civil laws of it; because
this obligation of these civil laws arises from their own consent."'"
The formation of civil society, in Rutherforth's calculus, although
itself a dictate of the law of nature, creates a system that comes to
be superimposed on nature itself. As a result, those who enter into
civil society find themselves both with new rights and with new
obligations as regards one another.3 2 Thus does civil society not
merely seek to secure what nature has left insecure; it seeks also to
embellish the natural order by creating institutions charged with the
perfection of human safety and happiness, that is, the promotion of
the common good." Under a civil society, the rights of mankind, as
those were known in the natural state, "are different in many
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 257.
31. Ibid., p. 361.
32. Ibid., p. 259.
33. Ibid., pp. 300-01. "[All civil legislative power is under an internal check of
right: it is a power of restraining or altering the rights of the subjects for the
purposes of advancing or securing the general good, and not of restraining or
altering them for any purpose whatsoever, and much less for no purpose at all."
Institutes, p. 370.
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instances" within the civil order. Indeed, all the rights of nature
"are not brought under the jurisdiction of civil society by the act of
3' 4
civil union."
This distinction between civil rights and natural rights is essential
to grasping Rutherforth's theory of interpretation. For in his view
of civil society, while the law of nature suggests if not compels civil
society, it does not necessarily intrude into the day-to-day
administration of the civil authority once formed. There is no doubt,
Rutherforth argues, that natural laws are those which mankind is
"obliged to observe from their nature and constitution. 3a Indeed,
that obligation to natural law does not cease when mankind enters
civil society; man must still "have recourse to that law of nature,
which respects mankind as they are individuals, in order to determine
what is just and fit to be done in respect of one another.' '36 Yet that
law of nature does not become legally or politically binding as a
matter of civil law unless formally adopted as such. Says Rutherforth:
Mankind are ... obliged to do what the law of nature commands,
and to avoid what this law forbids, without the aid of civil
institutions ....
[TIhough the members of a civil society are
obliged to observe the law of nature; whether its rules and precepts
are transcribed into the civil law and adopted by it or not; ...
Yet till they are thus transcribed and adopted, the obligation to
37
observe them rests only upon the conscience.
Once civil society has been entered into by consenting individuals,
that community must turn its attention at once to the next step in
Rutherforth's sketch: the formation of a government and the
institutions of civil authority. For, as indicated above, it is only by
such institutions that civil society can achieve the objects for which
men entered into it in the first place. Civil society without civil
government is a pointless association; the original right of each to
govern himself is insufficient, even when put in common league with
that original right in others. The mere act of joining together for
''common purpose," while surely revealing an original and inherent
legislative power, does not a government make.3 8
34. Ibid., pp. 326, 332. As Rutherforth suggests: "What is naturally right or
wrong is a proper matter of civil laws; but it is not the only proper matter for
them." As a result: "Till the civil laws .

.

. have enjoyned or forbidden what in a

state of nature was [left] indifferent; it continues to be so far indifferent, as to the
members of a civil society, that it is no duty of strict justice to do or to avoid."
Institutes, pp. 368, 369.
35. Ibid., p. 5.
36. Ibid., p. 248.
37. Ibid., p. 366.
38. Ibid., p. 249.
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There is indeed an original legislative power in every civil society;
but some further act is necessary, besides the mere union into
such a society before this power can be naturally vested in any
one part of society exclusive of the rest.

Further, he notes:
There is not naturally in any civil society, merely as a civil society,
any select and standing body of men with an exclusive legislative
power. Whenever a power of this sort is lodged in such a legislative
body, it must, in order to be consistent with the natural rights of
mankind, have been lodged there by some other act, besides the
original agreement, upon which the society was formed.3 9
The need is for "some further compact"; the need is for a rationally
designed "constitutional compact" whereby the powers and limits of
the civil authority are assigned.4 As civil society is superimposed
upon the natural order, so the civil constitution is superimposed on
the civil society. And it is not less essential to the preservation and
promotion of individual liberty than the original compact; indeed, it
may even be more so even though the form it may take is a matter
of the discretion and choice of those who are to live under it.4l For,

ultimately, it is the civil constitution that gives form to community:
A number of men, though they may happen to live near one
another, to meet frequently, and to work or travel together, will
only be a herd or company of detached and independent individuals, till they have bound themselves to one another by compact
to act joyntly under the direction of their common understanding
for the preservation of their rights and the advancement of their
general interest. 42
It is the deliberation over, and the choosing of, the forms of
government that gives true purpose to the original social compact.
For it is in the forms of the institutional arrangements that the
common purpose of the people is given concrete expression; those
forms, in constituting the means of achieving the ends originally
sought-the safety of the individual and the security of his rightsare nothing less than "the joynt understanding of the society in
directing what is proper to be done. ' 43 It is, in short, the fulfillment
of the individuals' human potential to reason and to will acting in
39. Ibid., pp. 285, 287.
40. Ibid., pp. 288, 587.
41. From their original civil state, the people "are at liberty ... to establish
any form of government that they please." Institutes, p. 566.
42. Ibid., p. 585.
43. Ibid., p. 284.
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concert to conform to the dictates of the law of nature to the greatest
extent possible." It is in this fulfillment of man's nature that the
law of nature is connected to the laws of man.
B.

RUTHERFORTH'S UNDERSTANDING

OF LAW

Rutherforth's view of law is, of course, rooted in his understanding
of the nature and origin of civil society. It involves, at its deepest
level, the relationship between the higher law, the laws of nature and
of nature's God, and the lower law, man's civil law.
"A law," Rutherforth begins his Institutes, "is a rule to which
men are obliged to make their moral actions conformable. ' 45 At its
most basic level, there is the law of nature; but that law is not all
encompassing in Rutherforth's political scheme. What matters among
the various laws of nature are not those laws governing the "instinct
of brute creatures" or those related to "the motions and operations
of inanimate matter." What matters are those laws of nature men
are "obliged to observe from their nature and constitution": those
laws, which properly understood, govern man's moral actions, those
actions "in which men have knowledge to guide them, and a will to
chuse for themselves." '47 And when he gets down to it, the law of
nature for Rutherforth is not all that mystical:
Upon the whole, mankind are naturally desirous of making themselves as happy as they can and whatever rules are by their nature
and constitution made necessary for them to observe, in order to
obtain this greatest good, are the law of their nature. And these
rules have been shewn to consist, first, in piety and reverence
towards God; ... secondly, in justice and benevolence toward
one another, or in working for a common interest by taking care
to do no harm, and by endeavoring to do good; and, thirdly, in
restraining their appetites by chastity and temperance, so as neither
themselves nor others, by the improper indulgence of
to hurt
48
them.
Thus as the foundation for a good civil society, natural law, while
a step in the right direction, is ultimately insufficient. And its
insufficiency springs from its very generality. What becomes necessary
44. As Rutherforth
mutual consent in order
purpose." Institutes, p.
of the rational faculties
45. Institutes, p.l.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 7.

says: "A society is a number of men united together by
to deliberate, determine, and act joyntly for some common
249. It is, in other words, in the demand for the exercise
that civil society elevates mankind.
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for civil society to be worthy of the name are laws of a more
particular nature, laws that will flesh out just precisely how mankind
is expected to restrain his appetites; just precisely how one is expected
to behave toward his fellows; and just precisely what is meant by
"taking care to do no harm, and . .. endeavoring to do good." In
short, civil society in the end depends more upon civil laws than the
sanctionless platitudes of the laws of nature. For unless those platitudes
are transcribed as law, and given the force of the state to back them
up, they are no more compelling as a matter of public law than the
49
private consciences of the people.
With regard to the civil law, Rutherforth says it may be either
written or unwritten. And his theoretical distinction between the two
forms of civil law is a critical one for understanding his notions of
interpretation as well as his idea of the relationship between natural
law and positive law.
The unwritten law of which Rutherforth speaks is of a decidedly
lower order than the written law. Such unwritten laws are generally
those "established by long and uninterrupted usage or custom." 50
The fact is, this kind of law reduces the idea of law-rules properly
laid down by the civil authority-to "the precarious custody of
unwritten tradition." Law in the strict sense, in the safe sense, is
law that has been "authenticated" by the legitimate legislative authority
in the state.5" What lies at the core of this notion of authentication
is the fact that when legislators undertake to posit true civil law they
will "usually record what they have done in writing; so that the
several members of the society, who are concerned in the laws of it,
may know both where to find them and what they are." '5 2 The reason
this is essential to the power of law is that "no positive law extends
farther than the intention of the legislator." 53 Unless the civil law
carries with it this means of its authenticity, if it is merely unwritten
law, then it lacks the certainty that the rule of law demands.
Unwritten law is, in the end, too amorphous to be law in the same
sense as true written law:
49. As James Madison would flesh out this thought later: "If the impulse and
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious
motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on
the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the
number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful."
The Federalist, No. 10, p.61.

50. Institutes, p. 395.
51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 396.
53. Ibid., pp. 396-97.
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Unwritten laws . . . either were not made at first by a civil
legislator, professedly employed in the business of legislation, but
have arisen out of immemorial and uninterrupted usage and custom; or else, if they were made at first by a civil legislator
professedly employed in this business, the evidence of their having
been so made is lost, and they have only the authority of the like
usage and custom to support them.
Further:
There is a plain reason why it should be more difficult to find
out what is prescribed by an unwritten law, than by a written one.
The rules of unwritten law may, indeed, be committed to writing.
But when they are, it will still be a question, whether such writing
contains the law or not: because it will not appear, from the
writing itself, that it is authenticated; or that the rules, which it
contains, are prescribed by any legislator. The law is founded on
usage and custom only:54and consequently, it can only be collected
from usage or custom.
As a result of this infirm foundation, such unwritten law is not
some higher law untouchable by the hand of man; custom and long
usage are not sufficient to elevate the unwritten law above the written
law. Indeed, such unwritten laws are open to reform or rejection at
the will of the legislator. "The standing legislator of a civil society,"
Rutherforth remarks, "if he does not consent to any usage which
generally obtains amongst the members of such society, might at any
time interrupt or stop it, by forbidding it." Only the acquiescence
5
of the legislator gives such customs the sanction of law.
This ease of repeal of the unwritten law by expressly adopted
written law is what renders it of a lower order in Rutherforth's view.
Indeed, far from being the binding dictates of a higher law, such
unwritten laws may even fall from force by mere disuse. As he sees
it:
The unwritten laws of a civil society are sometimes repealed or
altered by an express act of the legislative body of the society;
that is, though they were established at first by usage or custom,
they are sometimes repealed or altered afterward by written laws.
They may, likewise, be repealed or altered by long disuse or

54. Ibid. This is not to say there is no formal means whereby to discern the
long usage and custom in question. The usual means for establishing "authentic
evidences of the unwritten law" is the determination made by "the records of what
has been done from time to time in the courts of judicature." Yet this common
law, even as ascertained by the courts, lacks the power to hold sway over the explicit
written law that may be adopted. Institutes, p. 397.
55. Ibid., p. 396.
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prescription: for, as the consent of the society, upon which they
are established, is collected only from the presumptive evidence of
usage and custom; so long and uninterrupted disuse affords the
same evidence,
that the society has consented to repeal or alter
6
them.

Against this relatively easy malleability of the unwritten law, the
written law stands firmer. While written laws may surely be altered
or repealed by other written laws, "no written law can be repealed
merely by disuse.1 5 7 The reason this is so, says Rutherforth, is that
"no presumption can set aside a certainty: the record in which the
written law appears, is a certain evidence of its having been established
by sufficient authority; whereas, disuse affords, at most, only a
presumption of its having been repealed by the like authority." 5 8
Even when written laws grow obsolete, "we are not to understand
that they have ceased to oblige. ' 59 In Rutherforth's view, what gives
the written law its certainty and its stability is its greater possibility
of revealing the intention of the lawmaker: "all civil laws either
have, or ought to have, the prevention of some evil or the attainment
of some good in view. "60 And it is this purpose, this intention, that
gives the written law its greater power.
Related to this understanding of law, written and unwritten, are
Rutherforth's ideas pertaining to the "constitutional compact" all
civil societies must have, and the nature and extent of judicial power
under that constitution. The essence of the constitutional compact is
the creation of various powers; for Rutherforth there were but two,
legislative and executive. Of those two, it was the legislative power
that was most significant. "The legislative is the joynt understanding
of the society directing what is proper to be done and is therefore
naturally superior to the executive, which is the joynt strength of the
society exerting itself in taking care that what is so directed shall be
done." ' 6' That is not to say, however, that the executive power is of
no great consequence: "A legislative power without an executive one
would be of no great use." 62
This necessary if subordinate executive power is of two kinds;
there is an external executive power and an internal executive power.

56. Ibid., p. 397.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Ibid., p. 398.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 274.
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The executive power is internal "when it is exercised upon objects
within the society; when it is employed in securing the rights or
enforcing the duties of the several members, in respect either of one
another or of society itself." ' 63 The judicial power, rather than
understood as a separate and independent power, is deemed by
Rutherforth as the internal branch of the executive power. This
judicial power itself is subsequently presented as consisting of two
branches, one civil, the other criminal.(, The reason Rutherforth
places the judicial power under the rubric of the executive power is
that for judicial determinations to have effect they must have "the
65
joynt force of society" backing them up.
What is significant in Rutherforth's analysis for understanding how
his theory of interpretation applies to the judicial power is his belief
that "the legislature adjusts and settles the rights of the several
members of a civil society.'"' And as the executive power generally
is subordinate to the legislature, so, too, is the internal, judicial
branch of that executive power. The judicial power is expected to
exert itself only "under such checks and controls, as the legislative
power has subjected it to, in order to prevent its deviating from the
purposes, for which it was formed. ' 67 The reason, says Rutherforth,
is merely a matter of common sense:
[Ain internal executive power, which is under no checks or controls
from the legislature, would be more dangerous than useful; it
must be either a brute force uninformed and unguided by any
intelligent principle, or else a discretionary power in the hands of
them, who are entrusted with the management of it.68
To Rutherforth, either alternative was unacceptable.
Although it is the power that is expected necessarily to predominate,
the legislative authority is never to be considered simply independent.
It, too, is under the control of the constitutional compact:
The particular form of government in any society consists in the
particular sort of legislative body, by which that society is governed, or in the particular sort of body, to which the legislative
power of the collective body is given .... If we would say anything
in defence of [such a body's] right to any legislative power, we
must go to a higher source of law, to a legislative power vested
63. Ibid., pp. 273-74.
64. Ibid., p. 275.

65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 274.
67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.
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originally in the collective body of the society, which settled in
this particular legislative body, all the power they have of making
laws, so as to bind the whole. 69

Thus as the constitutional compact is based upon the consent of
those who have agreed to be bound by it, so, too, is the legislative
power created by it tied to that original consent. As a result it is
necessary that the civil constitution be understood as "fixed and
permanent," as lying beyond change by the ordinary legislative
power. Such "fixed and permanent" constitutions, while they are
changeable, are "not variable in their own nature." 70 As Rutherforth
puts it: "The constitution . ..may indeed be changed, but it is not
variable in itself: such consent, as introduced it at first, may alter it
afterwards."'7

Any alteration dictated by anything less than that

original consent would constitute a violation of the theory of natural
rights that undergirds the constitutional compact. As the members
of a civil society are obliged by the laws of nature, as a matter of
their consent, to obey the civil laws, so, too, are those who wield
power under the terms of the civil constitution obliged, by the laws
of nature, to be bound by that original consent. 72 "[A]gents who are
chosen and appointed by the people to exercise their constitutional
share of the legislative power, act under the constitutional compact,
and consequently are not authorized by such an appointment to
change the terms of the compact. ' 73 The creature cannot legitimately
recreate the creator. "The power of civil society ... extends no
farther than the purposes of the social compact, by which it was
produced."

74

It is this idea that the original purpose and intention of constitutional
compacts bind the discretion of those who wield power under the

69. Ibid., p. 292.
70. Ibid., p. 293.
71. Ibid., p. 296.
72. Ibid., pp. 357-58. "[T]he superiority of a civil legislator; that is, the right
which a civil legislator has to prescribe laws to the members of a civil society, arises
from their own consent .... The obligation of civil laws, as well as the obligation
of compacts, arises from the consent of those who are obliged by them." Ibid., p.
357.
73. Ibid., p. 567.
74. Ibid., p. 370. Thus is the task of the constitution makers great: "It is the
business of the politician, in order to guard against such excess in the exercise of
legislative power, to contrive some external checks upon the legislative body ....
Such checks as these . . . for preventing any undue exercise of legislative power,
are called constitutional checks .... This is the province of politics and not natural
law." Institutes, pp. 371, 372.
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terms of those compacts that lies at the heart of Rutherforth's canons
of construction.
C.

RUTHERFORTH'S CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Rutherforth's fundamental premise is a simple one:
The end, which interpretation aims at, is to find out what was
the intention of the writer; to clear up the meaning of his words,
if they are obscure; to ascertain the sense of them, if they are
ambiguous; to determine what his design was, where his words
express it imperfectly.75

This quest for intention is the foundation for all efforts at
interpretation for a powerful reason: law obligates people to obey
it; the essence of law is language; and thus "the obligations that are
produced by the civil laws ... arises from the intention of the
legislator; not merely as this intention as an act of mind; but as it
is declared or expressed by some outward sign or mark, which makes
it known to us." The endeavor is not to ascertain what may have
been the subjective intention of any one or even many lawmakers;
the objective is to discern the purpose foi" which the law was enacted,
what wrong was it intended to right, what problem was it intended
to correct.76 It is only if this purpose or intention can be known that
77
the people are obliged to comply with the civil law.
This interpretive effort is often easier said than done, however.
Language is, in and of itself, problematic: "sometimes a man's words
are obscure; sometimes they are ambiguous; and sometimes they
express his meaning so imperfectly', as either to fall short of his
intention and not express the whole of it, or else to exceed his
intention and express more than he designed." On such occasions,
Rutherforth suggests, "we must have recourse to some other means
of interpretation, that is, we must make some use of other signs or
marks, besides the words of the speaker or the writer, in order to
collect his meaning." These other marks and signs, Rutherforth
agrees with Grotius, are what are properly called "probable
conjectures. ' 78 But however difficult the task, the first duty of

75. Institutes, p. 405.
76. As Rutherforth says: "The meaning of a law is the design of the lawmaker
in respect to what he commands or forbids. The reason of a law is his design in
respect of the end or purpose, for which he commands or forbids it." Institutes,
p. 415.
77. Ibid., p. 404.
78. Ibid., p. 405.
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interpretation is to discern, to the degree possible, the meaning of
'79
the writer or the speaker according to "common use and custom."
Rutherforth divides his approach to interpretation into three
categories, "according to the different means that it makes use of,
for obtaining its end." Those categories are: literal interpretation,
mixed interpretation, and rational interpretation. 0 In Rutherforth's
calculus of construction, these three methods form something of a
continuum.
Literal interpretation is the most basic, text-bound approach: "When
the words of a man express his meaning planely, distinctly, and
perfectly, we have no occasion to have recourse to any other means
of interpretation." 8' Yet even at this level, it is possible to take a
word in either a "confined sense" or in a more "comprehensive
sense. " 8' 2 The key here is to try to discern the meaning of the words
used from "the common consent of those who use them." 8' 3 Thus to
opt for taking the word in question in its more comprehensive sense
is not to abandon the obligatory effort to get at the sense in which
the word was actually used by the writer or the speaker. On this
point Rutherforth is clear:
The principal rule to be observed in literal interpretation is to
follow that sense, in respect both of the words and of the construction, which is agreeable to common use, without attending to
etymological fancies or grammatical refinements.... By grammatical refinements ...I mean such rules of construction, as are
not justified by the common usage of the language before us, and
have nothing else to support them, but some groundless conjecture
or some supposed analogy between this language and others. ...
such rules or grammar, as, instead of being copied from common
use, are intended to overrule its authority. 84
But even when one conscientiously eschews such word games, and
tries diligently to get at the writer's meaning through literal
interpretation, there arise other problems. Not the least of the problems
is the ambiguity of language. Sometimes the word used "will admit
of two or more senses, and either of these . . . is equally agreeable
to common usage." In such a case, when common usage will not
settle the confusion, the interpreter "must have recourse to other

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p. 407.
pp. 407-08.
p. 405.
p. 420.
p. 407.
pp. 408-09.
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conjectures to fix it."8 It is at this point that literal interpretation
fades into mixed interpretation, a mode "partly literal and partly
rational." 6 Yet these "other conjectures" are not simply untethered
to the text:
In mixed interpretation ...the topics from whence our conjectures
are drawn, are either the subject matter of the writing, or the
effect, that it will produce, according as we continue in this or in
that sense, or lastly, some circumstances that are connected with
it.
This approach is bound down by certain rules of common sense:
When any words or expressions in a writing are of doubtful
meaning, the first rule in mixed interpretation is to give them such
a sense, as is agreeable to the subject matter, of which the writer
is treating. For we are sure, on the one hand, that this subject
matter was in his mind, and can, on the other hand, have no
reason for thinking that he intended anything which is different
from it, and much less, that he intended anything which is inconsistent with it .... The second rule, in mixed interpretation, is to
give all doubtful words or expressions that sense which makes
them produce some effect; this effect must in general be a reasonable one; and it must likewise be the same, that a lawmaker
or the testator or the contractor intended to produce .... [I]f we
give [the lawmaker's] words such a meaning, as is agreeable to
the reason of the law, to such a meaning as will make the law
produce the effect, which he intended to produce by it,
we give
7
them such a meaning, as is agreeable to his intention .
To go beyond these first efforts to resolve ambiguities and to seek
guidance from circumstantial evidence surrounding the law is still
not an invitation to ignore or abandon the primary obligation to
discern the intention of the writer. A basic circumstance from which
meaning might be gleaned is to examine what the same lawmaker
has said or written on other occasions. Yet still, those other writings
must have some connection with the language at hand: "Nothing,
which is wholly unconnected with such writing, can either be made
use of to explore any ambiguous words in it, or with any propriety
be called a circumstance of it."8 The presumption is that the writer
will always have been of "the same mind" and thus likely to have
been consistent in the meaning he presumed to convey in the language
he used. 89

85. Ibid., p. 410.

86. Ibid., p. 408.
87. Ibid., pp. 412, 413, 414.

88. Ibid., p. 416.
89. Ibid.
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Another means of arriving at "probable conjectures" over what
the original meaning of a law might be is a reliance bn what
Rutherforth calls "contemporary practice.' ' 9 This approach embraces
two standards: a reliance on common practices that may have prevailed
at the time the law was passed; and an account of "what was done
upon the law in the times immediately after the making of it."' 9 The
first standard is "only a remote topic of interpretation" insofar as
it can only give a sense of the probable reason the law was enacted
in the first place. And the second standard is not to be confused
with "contemporary construction," those interpretations given a law
by the courts. Rather, for Rutherforth, contemporary practice means
"the effect which the law produced in the behaviour of those, who
were obliged by it, and who lived at the time of the making of it,
[that] will help us to form a judgment about the meaning of the
legislator, where his words have left it doubtful." 92
This is not to say that contemporary judicial construction will not
also assist in this problem of getting at the original intention of a
particular law. While the adjudication of the courts of law are
themselves "authentic interpretations," judges who confront the same
law at a later date will no doubt find earlier judgments helpful. 93
Those first judicial determinations, those made by judges who were
"contemporaries of the legislator," will show later judges "in what
sense the law was understood by those, who had the best opportunity
of knowing the true sense, either by advising with the legislator
himself, or at least by seeing the situation of things which led him
to make the law."9' This is, to Rutherforth's way of thinking, merely
a matter of good sense:
Laws operate at a distance of time: those, who live many years,
after the laws were made, are obliged to act upon them, and are
therefore concerned to know their true meaning. But in length of
time the meaning of a law may become doubtful, though it was
clear and precise when it was just made. And since by looking
back into the contemporary practice, that is, into the practice,
which the law produced in the first instance, we may see in what
90. Ibid., p. 417.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 418.

93. Ibid. This is one of the many areas in which Rutherforth follows the lead
of Hobbes. Like Hobbes, what makes such judicial determinations "authentic" for
Rutherforth is not the judge's private notion of what is right or just, but the power
granted the judge to make such a determination by the sovereign. See Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan (1909), pp. 212-13.
94. Institutes, p. 418.
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sense it was then understood; a view of this practice will be a
means of removing any doubts about the sense of it, which are
owing only to our remoteness from its original establishment.95

At the farther end of the continuum of modes of interpretation,
past literal and mixed interpretations, lies that mode that requires
the greatest caution on the part of the interpreter: rational
interpretation, that mode which does not seek to confine itself to
the letter of the law. 96 Indeed, the gulf that separates literal and
mixed interpretations is not nearly so great as that which separates
both literal and mixed from the mode of rational interpretation.
Both literal and mixed keep close to the words being interpreted:
"even mixed interpretation is so far literal, that it keeps strictly to
the letter, without giving the words any sense, which common usage
has not given them; it only ascertains the sense, in which the writer
used the words, when common usage has given them more senses
than one. ' 97 Rational interpretation, which Rutherforth prefers to
call "liberal or free" interpretation, is a method in which the
interpreter may very well have to deviate from the letter and not
confine himself to it.98
Yet this "liberal or free" mode of interpretation is not an approach
that simply dismisses the intention of the writer in favor of the
inclinations of the interpreter; it is still interpretation in the most
meaningful sense. Even under this more liberal mode of considering
a text, the interpreter is bound by the obligation to seek the intention
of the legislator; that remains the only legitimate objective of the
interpreter. "[T]he business of interpretation [is] to find out the
meaning or design of the writer" and rational interpretation means
nothing more than endeavoring "to collect ... intention from
something else besides his words." 99 Relying solely on the "assistance
of conjectures" beyond the literal import of the words used is still
only a means to the higher end of determining intention.' l°
The essence of rational interpretation is not to supplant the original
intention of the law but to flesh it out, to give it effect in those
cases when a strictly literal or even mixed mode would not be able
to do it justice. The presumption in rational interpretation is, as it
also is with literal or mixed interpretations, that the lawgiver intended
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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to achieve something by the law in question. Either to prohibit some
action or to command another, the law, to make any sense at all,
must be presumed to have had a purpose. Rational construction does
not seek to alter or abolish that purpose, only to assist having that
purpose fulfilled.
There are two ways in which rational interpretation is to be
employed: "Sometimes the meaning of the writer is extended, so as
to take in more, and sometimes it is restrained, so as to take in less,
than his words import in their common acception."''
In the first
case, as Rutherforth says:
When we know what was the reason or final cause, which the
writer had in view, what end he proposed, or what effect he
designed to produce; and the meaning of the law ... if we were
to adhere closely to the words of it, would not come up to this
reason, or would not produce this effect, we may then conclude
that his words express his meaning imperfectly, and that his
meaning is to be extended beyond his words, so as to come up to
this reason, or so as to produce this effect. For it is much more
probable that the writer should fail in expressing his meaning,
than that his meaning should fall short of his purposes, which he
designed to obtain. 0 2
So also does such common sense obtain in those cases where the
language used must be retrained.
When we would restrain the meaning of a writer, and show that
it is less comprehensive than his words, or that some particular
case, which is included in his words, is not within his meaning;
we must argue, either for an original or for an accidental defect
in his intention; either we must argue that ... the lawmaker ...
could not intend originally to include the case in question, however
he may have so failed in his expression as to include it in his
words; or else we much argue that the case is an accidental one,
which probably was not foreseen originally, and that, if the writer
had foreseen it ... he would have limited his expression and have
particularly excepted the case in question.0 3
Neither extending the meaning nor restraining the meaning is
understood by Rutherforth to empower the interpreter to abandon
the serious business of ascertaining the original intention of the
lawgiver. Rational interpretation, he argues, is still aimed at the end
or the purpose which the lawgiver intended: "certainly we can never
argue, that his meaning ought to be extended beyond his words,
101. Ibid., p. 421.

102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., pp. 422-23.
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upon a reason which does not appear to have been in his mind."' 4
Similarly, "when we argue, that a particular case could not, originally,
be included in the meaning of the law; either because some absurd
consequence will follow from including it, or because some
consequence will follow which is inconsistent with the reason or end
of the law; we plainly argue, in both instances, from the effect."'' 5
Rational interpretation for Rutherforth, in the end, is very similar
to "equitable interpretation," especially as described by Joseph Story
in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence.106As Rutherforth put
it: "By equity is here meant, a fair and honest correction, of a law
...
where it appears that the lawmaker . . . either would or ought
to consent to such a correction, if they were to interpret their own

act.

17

Rutherforth's three types of interpretation-literal, mixed, and
rational-are, in the end united in their common purpose. Each is a
means, and only a means, toward one overarching end: "to find out
what was the intention of the writer; to clear up the meaning of his
words, if they are obscure; to ascertain the sense of them, if they
are ambiguous; to determine what his design was, where his words
express it imperfectly."1 08 Nowhere in his discussion of interpretation
does Rutherforth argue that a judge's private notions of justice may
legitimately supplant the intentions of the lawgiver.' °9 He most
104. Ibid., p. 421.
105. Ibid., p. 423.
106. As Story succinctly put it: "[W]ords of a doubtful import may be used in
a law, or words susceptible of a more enlarged or a more restricted meaning or of
two meanings equally appropriate. The question, in all such cases, must be, in what
sense the words were designed to be used; and it is the part of a judge to look to
the objects of the legislature, and to give such a construction to the words that will
best further those objects. This is an exercise of equitable interpretation." In no
way, as Story pointed out, should one deem such equitable interpretation as
embracing a jurisdiction "so wide and extensive, as that which arises from the
principles of natural justice." Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, II, pp. 2, 7.
107. Ibid., p. 427.
108. Ibid., p. 405.
109. The only time Rutherforth brushes up against the wall of natural law is
during his discussion of rational interpretation. "The general tenor of a law," he
remarks, "may be consistent with the law of nature: and yet such cases may arise,
accidentally, as will render it impossible to comply with the law

...

without

transgressing the law of nature. It is necessary to except such cases as these, when
they happen to arise; whether the legislator .

.

. originally excepted them or not."

Institutes, p. 428. But he does not go on to weave this into a general jurisprudential
maxim. What he seems to be talking about here has a good bit in common with
Alexander Hamilton's discussion of equitable discretion of judges in The Federalist.
In The Federalist, No. 80, Hamilton would argue that the "peculiar province" of
courts of equity is to give relief from "hard bargains: these are contracts, in which,
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assuredly never suggests that there is some higher, ,unwritten law
waiting to be summoned down by judges so to make the polity
conform to some abstract notion of justice; nor does he suggest that
rational interpretation is a shorthand notation for a recourse to
natural law. His theory of interpretation is much more modest than
that; it is much safer than that.
CONCLUSION

Thomas Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law is, in the end,
best understood as a work of republican political theory. His
understanding of the nature and obligation of consent and of the
freedom of a people, once assembled in a civil society, to determine
the contours of their civil constitution; and his belief in the power
of such constitutional compacts to limit the discretion of those whom
the people are obliged to trust with power were all theories that
found a welcoming audience in America. In addition, Rutherforth
provided the Americans with something more than those in whose
path he traveled-Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as well as Hugo
Grotius. His understanding of the nature and extent of interpretation
was spelled out with great and convincing clarity. 'To a people
committed both to the idea of man being governed by the laws of
nature and of nature's God, and the belief that a written constitution
is one of the greatest improvements on political institutions,
Rutherforth provided sound guidance.
Few American jurists have been more closely associated with the
idea of natural law than Joseph Story."10 It is instructive that so
committed an advocate of natural law as Story would take his point
of departure in sketching the rules for interpreting the Constitution
from Rutherforth. The reason is as simple as it is powerful:
Rutherforth provided canons of construction that took seriously the
claims of natural law but which also refused to allow those called
upon to interpret the written law to trump that law by untethered
though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them
in a court of law; yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage
taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties." And, as he summed
it up in The Federalist, No. 83: "The great and primary use of a court of equity
is to give relief in extraordinarycases, which are exceptions to general rules." pp.
539-40, 569. Given Rutherforth's own discussion of what is entailed in the law of
nature, this seems the limit of his argument for rational interpretations to make
certain the congruence between positive law and the law of nature.
110. See James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution (1971),
pp. 61-117.
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recourse to an allegedly unwritten higher law. Rutherforth understood,
as did Story, that while such abstract speculations may be morally
appealing as an idea, in practice they would be disastrous. For to
allow the written law to be routinely altered or abolished in the name
of an unwritten law deemed superior to it by the agents of the people
would spell the end of any meaningful notion of the rule of law. At
a minimum, it would spell the end of the idea of government that
drew its legitimacy only from the consent of the governed.
For those today who seek support for their notions of interpretation
that reject the demands of the Constitution as written law,
Rutherforth's Institutes will not provide it. His theories of civil
society, of law, and of interpretation go in precisely the opposite
direction. For Rutherforth, the line between natural law and
constitutional interpretation is one that should not be crossed; moral
theory and constitutional law are not the same thing

